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Symposium:
A Future Without the Administrative State?
Exploring the Administrative State
Erin Morrow Hawley*

The administrative state today “wields vast power and touches almost
every aspect of daily life.”1 There’s no question that the Founders would
have been surprised by the current administrative state.2 By and large, however, both the academy and Article III judges are either reluctant or enthusiastic devotees of the administrative state. A variety of arguments have been put
forward to situate the Fourth Branch within the constitutional fabric, from
constitutional moments,3 to the Supreme Court’s pragmatic recognition that,
given government as we know it, “Congress simply cannot do its job absent
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”4 As Jeff Pojanowski puts it in this Symposium, “Th[e] administrative state is here, and,
absent radical and unlikely changes in the scope of federal power, it is not
going away.”5
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law.
1. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499
(2010).
2. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (as one
Supreme Court Justice put it, the administrative state, “with its reams of regulations[,]
would leave [the Framers] rubbing their eyes”).
3. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law,
99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). But see PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative Estate, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
4. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
5. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1075
(2016).
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Yet a number of Supreme Court Justices have expressed concerns about
the “danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state.”6 As a
result, the Court has been increasingly open to structural challenges to the
administrative state in the last few terms.7 In particular, the Court has focused on the level of deference due administrative regulations.8 It has resurrected the major questions doctrine,9 recommended overturning the Auer
doctrine,10 and individual Justices have even questioned the constitutionality
of Chevron deference.11
It is time to consider the administrative state afresh given the Supreme
Court’s renewed interest in challenges to the status quo. In this vein, the Missouri Law Review Symposium seeks to advance the academic discussion by
looking closely at questions regarding the contours of the administrative state
and, in particular, examining reasonable alternatives to Chevron deference.
Professor Hamburger begins by further developing his claim that modern administrative law is unconstitutional and addresses concerns raised by
scholars in response to his book Is Administrative Law Unlawful?12 Professor
Hamburger first counters arguments that the royal prerogative power was
unlimited.13 He argues instead that such power was at times bound by statute,
and that in all events, the extralegal (meaning power exercised by administrators outside of the law) nature of the prerogative power remained problematic
and was addressed by English constitutional ideals, providing a basis for

6. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015);
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). See also Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed, 81 MO. L. REV. 1023, 1023–24 (2016) (“[T]he
Supreme Court of the United States and individual Justices have welcomed structural
challenges to the administrative state and Article I courts.”).
8. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338; Util. Air Regulatory Grp.
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
9. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (determining “whether [tax
credits] are available on Federal Exchanges is a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ . . . [and] had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency,
it surely would have done so expressly”); Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at
2444 (“We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”).
10. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339–
40 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
11. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring).
12. Philip Hamburger, Early Prerogative and Administrative Power: A Response
to Paul Craig, 81 MO. L. REV. 939, 939 (2016).
13. Id. at 942.
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American constitutional concerns over extralegal power.14 Professor Hamburger also responds to the claim that the existence of local and non-royal
extralegal “administrative” power in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
England establishes that the English constitution did not in fact develop to
limit extralegal administrative power.15 Professor Paul Craig, for example,
argues that such power was approved of by Parliament and by English courts
and that this legitimate power, and not the prerogative power, was the antecedent of contemporary American administrative law.16 Professor Hamburger responds that English constitutional ideals condemned the prerogative
power and were deployed mostly against centralized prerogative power.17 In
the U.S. Constitution, however, the Founders barred almost all extralegal
power.18 In sum, Professor Hamburger argues that early Americans drafted
their own constitutions, and, in particular, the U.S. Constitution, which condemn the use of extralegal administrative authority by looking to the English
constitutional response to extralegal edicts.19
Professor Jonathan Adler argues that, while Chevron deference may be
here to stay, it should be “confined to its proper domain.”20 The underlying
rationale for deference, he argues, should determine Chevron’s “scope and
application.”21 Thus, since Chevron is “predicated on a theory of delegation,” Chevron deference should only be available when Congress has in fact
delegated interpretive authority.22
Professor Joseph Postell sees the growing administrative state as a threat
to republican government. He claims that the nondelegation theory has been
unpersuasive because that theory is based upon wrong constitutional assumptions.23 He argues that, while the doctrine “is typically linked to the theory of
the separation of powers, the true foundation . . . is the idea of the social
compact and the related theory of republican government.”24 According to
Postell, the transfer of legislative power to administrative agencies is problematic because it is outside the chain of accountability – the people do not
elect agency officials either directly or indirectly.25

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 942–51.
Id. at 951–69.
Id. at 951.
Id.
Id. at 956–58.
Id.
Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983, 985

(2016).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Joseph Postell, “The People Surrender Nothing”: Social Compact Theory,

Republicanism, and the Modern Administrative State, 81 MO. L. REV. 1003, 1003,
1008 (2016).
24. Id. at 1003.
25. Id.
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Professor Kent Barnett contends that challenges to administrative judges
and their appearance of partiality “are well positioned to be part of the new
wave of structural challenges to the administrative state.”26 He believes that
challenges to administrative judging may fare well for several reasons. First,
to require nonpartiality from administrative law judges would not require the
Court to overrule any of its decisions, and indeed, such a requirement is consistent with recent case law.27 Second, a challenge to the partiality of administrative judging fits within the Court’s recent affinity for formalist results.28
Finally, as a practical matter, there may be enough votes on the Supreme
Court for partiality challenges to succeed.29 Professor Barnett concludes by
arguing that, since “finding partiality within the administrative state would
likely have significant, widespread disruptive effects, the President, agencies,
and Congress should rethink administrative adjudication before courts make
them do so.”30
Professor Andy Grewal argues that the Supreme Court’s shifting attitude
towards administrative deference should not affect its deference to the IRS’s
interpretation of the income tax code.31 Professor Grewal posits that courts
should defer to the IRS, rather than apply the rule of lenity, in dual application (civil and criminal) statutes, “because the rule of lenity has no place in
the construction of the income tax provisions.”32 This is because such statutes do not compel or prohibit behavior; they “simply describe consequences
associated with particular transactions.”33
Professor Aditya Bamzai takes us on a historical journey to recover the
true meaning of Marbury v. Madison’s famous statement that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the [judiciary] to say what the law is.”34 He
argues that recent decisions limiting deference to agencies based on Marbury
have ignored the statutory analysis in that case.35 On a closer read, the Marbury Court considered three types of “deference,” “through its (1) treatment
of executive custom in statutory interpretation, (2) discussion of the ‘political
question’ doctrine, and (3) use of the ministerial/executive distinction under
the writ of mandamus.”36 Professor Bamzai argues that since these doctrines
together gave rise to modern deference to executive interpretation, under26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Barnett, supra note 7, at 1025.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Andy S. Grewal, Why Lenity Has No Place in the Income Tax Laws, 81 MO.
L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2016).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Aditya Bamzai, Marbury v. Madison and the Concept of Judicial Deference,
81 MO. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (2016) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803)).
35. Id. at 1062.
36. Id.
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standing their application in Marbury gives us a better understanding of the
rise of judicial deference.37 It also provides a mode of critique.38
Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski imagines a world without Chevron where
courts review agency conclusions on questions of law de novo.39 He argues
that, while this alternative has some appeal, it is unlikely to bring as much
change as the Chevron critics believe.40 Indeed, the largest “change would
come from how we think about law and policy in the administrative state.”41
Instead of the moderate legal realism underlying Chevron, non-deferential
review rests on a far more classical understanding.42 Professor Pojanowski
argues that this classical understanding sheds light “on the rise and (partial)
fall of Chevron in administrative legal thought.”43
Professor Christopher Walker maintains that, with the passing of Justice
Scalia, the Supreme Court is unlikely to toss Chevron (or even Auer) deference to the curb, but it might well embrace a different narrowing mechanism:
a context-specific Chevron doctrine.44 Professor Walker explains that the
Chief Justice’s invocation of the major questions doctrine in King v. Burwell
at the Step Zero stage is a novel use of that doctrine.45 In particular, he argues that the Chief Justice’s decision to avoid entirely the Chevron framework is an outworking of his earlier dissent in City of Arlington.46 In that
case, the Chief Justice argued that Congress must have delegated to an agency on a specific issue in order for the Court to assume that Congress intended
the courts to defer to agency interpretations.47 Counting votes, Professor
Walker argues that the academy should pay attention to the Chief Justice’s
Chevron-limiting approach, as it may well become the law of the land.48
Further, Professor Walker explains how recent empirical studies of congressional drafters and agency rule drafters provide support for a context-specific
Chevron doctrine.49
Professor Emily Bremer considers a novel alternative to a reduced or
even eliminated administrative state: private governance.50 Her article challenges the assumption that there are only two options: “governmental regula37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Pojanowski, supra note 5.
Id. at 1078.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron Deference, 81
MO. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2016).
45. See id. at 1103, 1107.
46. Id. at 1105–06.
47. Id. at 1105.
48. Id. at 1099, 1106.
49. Id. at 1107.
50. Emily S. Bremer, Private Complements to Public Governance, 81 MO. L.
REV. 1115, 1115 (2016).
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tion or no regulation at all.”51 She argues that private governance – meaning
nongovernmental action in the pursuit of traditional government goals – may
complement and in some instances replace the administrative state.52 She
offers a number of current examples and suggests that comparative institutional analysis can help identify situations where private governance “may be
an effective and attractive alternative to governmental regulation.”53

51. Id.
52. Id. at 1119–20.
53. Id. at 1120.
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